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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATUTORY
PROVISION CREATING A ONE-YEAR
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR RECEIVING
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS*
Prior to April 21, 1969, nearly one half of the states and the
District of Columbia imposed an arbitrary one-year residency
requirement upon any applicant for public assistance.' Today
these statutory provisions still exist but they have been declared
unconstitutional by the celebrated "welfare residency require-
ments case" of Shaprio v. Thompson.2 This case reached the
Supreme Court as a result of appeals from decisions of three
district courts holding one-year residency requirements uncon-
stitutional. The basis of all three district court decisionss was
that the residency requirement created a classification which
constitutes an invidious discrimination denying the respondents
"equal protection of the laws."4 However, two cases, Thompson
v. Shupirou and Harrell v. Tob2 ,ner, also used an alternate
theory that residency requirements created an unconstitutional
restriction on freedom of travel. The Supreme Court in Shapiro
used both theories as a foundation for its decision but based the
result principally on the equal protection argument.
I. EQUAL PnoT~ oN or T~m L&ws
A. General
Public welfare statutes have been passed by the states and the
District of Columbia to promote the general welfare and well-
being of all people of the state or district by providing public
* Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct 1322 (1969).
1. The following states, among others, impose a residency requirement of at
least one-year as a qualification for receiving relief of any type: Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
2. 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
3. Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967) ; Smith v. Reynolds,
277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D
Conn. 1967).
4. U. S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
6. 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
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assistance to the needy and distressed. To be effective, that
assistance should be administered promptly when need arises.7
Normally a proceeding for welfare benefits is not an adversary
proceeding but is simply an application for relief benefits from
a fund. The procedure is prescribed by statute or administrative
board but must be in accordance with the basic concepts of due
process of law. States, by statute or via administrative proceed-
ings, may classify the applicants for assistance, but such classi-
fications cannot be arbitrary or invidious." When made on
natural and reasonable grounds, the grant of rights and privi-
leges to one class will not necessarily amount to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to members of other classes.9
B. Rationaw ReZatonmhip Doctrine
In 1911,10 the Supreme Court set down several rules which
were to be used to determine whether classifications for various
state purposes violated the equal protection of the laws:
1) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not take from the state the power to classify
in the adoption of police [and welfare] laws, but admits
of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that re-
gard, and avoids what is done only when it is without
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2) A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results
in some inequality. 3)When the classification in such a
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4) One who assails the classification in
such a law must carry the burden of showing that it
does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
abitrary.11
7. Green v. Department of Public Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del.
1967).
8. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
9. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
10. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The statute
under consideration in this case was directed against pumping gas from wells
bored into rock and against pumping gas for the purpose of collecting and
vending it The statute did not affect wells which did not penetrate rock or
which pumped gas for purposes other than vending it.
11. Id. at 78-79.
1969]
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Under these rules the legislature has a very broad discretion
as to matters of classification, and its judgment with reference
thereto will be respected and enforced by the courts, unless the
classification is so arbitrary that there is no conceivable basis in
reason therefor.12 The fourteenth amendment permits states a
wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which effect some
groups of citizens differently than others, and constitutional
safeguards are offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of legitimate state
objectives. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within
their constitutional powers despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality.18 With respect to the with-
holding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare
program, the equal protection clause interposes a bar only if the
statute in question manifests an obviously arbitrary classifica-
tion, utterly lacking in rational justification. 4
Recently in McDonald v. Board of Election (7ommissioners,15
decided eight days after Shapiro, the Court reiterated this basic
theme when it emphasized the fact that the states have wide
leeway under the fourteenth amendment to make classifications.
The Court speaking through Chief Justice Warren said that
there was no settled formula used by the Court to decide whether
or not a state statute violates the equal protection clause, but
some basic guidelines have been firmly fixed.
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must
bear some rationaZ relationship to a legitinate 8tate end
and will be set aside as violation of the Equal Protection
12. Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. Milvaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 447, 109
N.W.2d 271 (1961).
13. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In this case the Supreme
Court upheld a Sunday closing law because the state legislature could reason-
ably find that Sunday sale of exempted commodities was necessary either for
the health of the populace or the enhancement of recreational atmosphere of
the day and was not repugnant to equal protection of the laws by virtue of
such exemptions.
14. Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In this case, in a five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Social Security Act
which terminated old-age benefits for aliens deported from the United States
for having been members of the Communist Party.
15. 89 S. Ct. 1404 (1969). In this case the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois
absentee voting statute which, in providing for absentee ballots to persons who
for medical reasons could not go to the polls or who would be out of the coun-
try, had failed to provide for absentee ballots to inmates in county jails. The
Court refused to use the compelling interest doctrine [to be discussed below] in
deciding the equal protection issue because the right to vote was not at stake,
only a "claimed right to receive absentee ballots." Id. at 1408.
[Vol. 21
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Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the
pursuit of that goal.'8
The Supreme Court went further and stated that state "statutory
classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be con-
ceived to justify them."' 7
C'. Compelfling Governmental Interest Doctrine
In spite of this continuing line of thought, the Supreme Court,
in Asbury Hospitalv . Cass County,'8 stated that a legislature is
free to make classifications in the application of a statute which
is relevant to the legislative purpose. The court emphasized that
the ultimate test of validity is not whether the classes differ,
but whether the differences between them are pertinent to the
subject with respect to the classification made. After Asbury
Hospital, the issue as to whether a classification is constitutional
or not would seem to be whether the classification is reasonable
in the light of some proper legislative purpose.'9 In spite of the
Asbury Hospital or the MoDonaod tests, the Court in Sluzpiro
proclaimed that a mere rational relationship between the waiting
period and several admittedly permissible state objectives (i.e.
(1) facilitating the planning of the welfare budget; (2) provid-
ing an objective test of residency; (3) minimizing the oppor-
tunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more
than one jurisdiction; and (4) encouraging early entry of new
residents into the labor force) 20 will not suffice to justify the
classification. This same result was reached in two earlier unap-
pealed district court cases.21 The basic reasoning of all three
16. Id. at 1408 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1408.
18. 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
19. Drueling v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1963). In this case a Maryland one-
year residence requirement for voting in national elections was upheld under
the equal protection clause. The Court recognized that the purposes for the
requirement were to identify the voter, to protect against fraud in voting, and
to insure that the voter will become in fact a member of the community. Given
these purposes, the Court felt that it could not say that the discrimination was
irrational. However, in McLaughin v. Florida, 279 U.S. 184 (1964), the Su-
preme Court held that a Florida statute which made it illegal for a white man
and a Negro woman, or vice versa, who are not married, to occupy the same
room at night was a violation of the equal protection clause because the class-
ification was not reasonable in light of its legislative purpose. See also Smith
v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Green v. Department of Public
Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
21. Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735 (D. Mass. 1968). A Massachusetts
statute requiring one year residence before applicant is eligible to receive aid
to families with dependant children violated the equal protection clause as lack-
ing any proper governmental purpose.; Ramos v. Health and Social Services
1969]
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cases was that the residency requirement defeated the legislative
purpose of the statute, which, according to the courts, was to
give aid to needy families regardless of their length of residence
in the state.
To support the finding that the residency requirement created
an unconstitutional classification the Court in ,Shapira said that
any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of a con-
stitutional right (the right to interestate travel)2 2 must be
supported by a compelling governmental interest. "And it is the
character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines
which standard governs the choice [Rational Relationship Doc-
trine or Compelling State Interest Doctrine]." 23 In support of
choosing the higher standard of requiring the state interest to be
compelling as opposed to merely rational, the Supreme Court
drew from a line of cases concerning the encroachment upon
personal liberties protected by the Federal Constitution.
24
This line of cases traditionally involved racial discrimination
and constitutionally protected rights in which the Supreme
Court had applied the stricter standard for upholding state
statutes under the equal protection clause. Recently in Kramer
v. Union Free School District23 the Court, in dictum, stated that
cases involving election laws should be decided by applying the
"compelling state interest"2 doctrine. However, in Kramear the
Court did not find it necessary to apply this standard and de-
cided the case on other grounds. The case involved the exclusion
of citizens who did not own real property in the district or were
not parents or guardians of school children from voting in the
election of the district school board. In declaring the statute un-
constitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause, the
Supreme Court relied on the rational relationship doctrine by
stating that even if New York could constitutionally limit the
Bd., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis. 1967). "The one-year residence requirement
for state aid was not reasonable in light of purpose of requirement, since it had
effect of conclusive presumption that all people who need aid within a year
have come to state for that purpose."
22. The right to travel interstate will be discussed in part II.
23. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
24. Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 5, 11 (1968). "In determining whether the
State has power to place such unequal burdens on minority groups where rights
of this kind are at stake [election laws], the decisions of this court have con-
sistently held that 'only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a sub-
ject within the state's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting first
amendment freedoms'." See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
25. 89 S. Ct. 1886 (1969).
26. Id. at 1891.
[Vol. 21
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franchises in school district elections to those primarily inter-
ested in school affairs, the statute failed to "accomplish this
purpose with sufficient precision to justify denying appellant
the franchise. '2 7 In support of its statement that the stricter
standard should be used in election law cases, the Court, on the
same day they decided Kramer, stated:
[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote in
a limited purpose election to some otherwise qualified
voters and denies it to others 'the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest.'28
One case in South Carolina, Gray v. Gardner,29 avoided the
issue. The District Court held that the arbitrary one-year period
which determined the parents' eligibility for insurance benefits
for the death of their child was not the exclusive period for use
in determining their entitlement to Social Security benefits. The
case was decided on the definition of "a reasonable time," set
forth in an amendment to the applicable Social Security regula-
tion. The amendment said that a reasonable time was ordinarily
twelve months, but not automatically.
Waggoner v. Rosem,30 whose facts were substantially the
same as Shzpiro, held the opposite from Shapiro. This court
based its decision on judicial meddling into a traditionally legis-
lative function when it said:
We can only say that we regard the substitution of
judicial judgment for that of legislative judgment as
nothing less than judicial usurpation of the legislative
function in disregard of the doctrine of separation of
powers so firmly established since the founding of our
Republic, and of the teaching of numerous decisions of
the Supreme Court.81
II. RiGa' To TAVEL INTERSTATE
The right to travel interstate is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution of the United States. However, as early as 1849 the
27. Id. at 1892.
28. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 1899 (1969).
29. 261 F. Supp. 736 (D.S.C. 1966).
30. 286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968). In this case the district court upheld
a one year residency requirement imposed by the Pennsylvania Public Welfare
Code as a condition of eligibility for public assistance grants to needy families
with minor children.
31. Id. at 279.
1969]
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Supreme Court recognized this right in the celebrated Pas8enger
G.a8ee8P
For all the great purposes for which the federal gov-
ernment was formed, we are one people, with one
common country. We are all citizens of the United
States; and, as members of the same community, must
have the right to pass and repass through every part
of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
state.88
More recently the Supreme Court has said:
The constitutional right to travel from one state to
another, and necessarily to use the highways and other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, oc-
cupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly estab-
lished and repeatedly recognized .... In any event, free-
dom to travel throughout the United States has long
been recognized as a basic right under the Constitu-
tion. 4
The courts in Harrell v. Tobiner,8 TkoMpson v. Shzpiro,36
and Shapiro v. Thompseo had their greatest difficulty showing
that the residency requirement restricted this right to travel
interstate without due process of law. In dictum the Supreme
Court proclaimed in ZeMel V. RUsTk1 that a state may prohibit
interstate travel by quarantining an area when it can be demon-
strated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and
materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or
nation. In United States v. Guest8s the Court placed the federal
right of interstate travel upon the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution by stating that the federal commerce
power encompasses the movement in interstate commerce of
persons as well as commodities. These two cases suggest that
under proper circumstances the states and the federal govern-
ment may restrict the right to freely travel interstate.
32. 7 How. 283 (1849).
33. Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1329 (1969), quoting Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849).
34. U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
35. 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967).
36. 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
37. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
38. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
[Vol. 21
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One prior case3 9 -ith substantially identical facts proclaimed
that the right to travel argument is so specious and unfounded
that it did not merit extended discussion. The court in this case
dismissed the contention with one sentence:
The fact that the one-year eligibility requirement may
operate to affect a decision to travel into Pennsylvania
cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as a
statutory bar to travel. 40
The court in Shapiro did not feel the restriction on the right to
travel -was such an outlandish proposition. It said that an
idigent person cannot freely travel to another state (regardless
of his motivation) for fear of starving in that state until he can
procure a job. The court recognized the fact that some individ-
uals may travel to another state to receive higher welfare bene-
fits, but the deterence of this (a legitimate state objective) will
not justify the restriction placed on travel by the one-year -wait-
ing period to receive welfare benefits.
The Supreme Court in an earlier case4 struck down a Cali-
fornia statute which made it a misdemeanor for a person to
bring or assist in bringing into the state any indigent person
who was not a resident, on the grounds that the statute imposed
an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. Protection
of interstate commerce served as the vehicle by which the Su-
preme Court handled cases in which state legislatures infringed
on interstate travel.
42
Prior to these welfare cases the major litigation condemning
restrictions on travel involved passports and travel out of the
United States, as opposed to travel within the country.43 In
fact in only one case44 has the Supreme Court invalidated on a
constitutional basis a congressional imposed restriction. This
case involved a congressional act which made it a felony for a
member of a Communist organization to apply for, use, or
attempt to use a United States passport. There have been other
cases involving passports and restrictions on travel out of the
39. Waggoner v. Rosenn, 286 F. Supp. 275 (M.D. Pa. 1968).
40. Id. at 280.
41. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
42. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
43. FREEsom To TAvEL. REPORT OF THE Sp=cX Comrnm To STuDY
PAssPoRT PRocmauass oF THE Assoc ox OF Tm BA oF THz Crry or NEW
YoR , (1958).
44. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
1969]
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United States.45 However, these cases, like the present one, have
held that a person cannot be deprived of his right to travel
without due process of law. The principle of these cases has been
that an individual cannot be deprived of his right to travel
unless he is a fugitive, has been returned to the United States
at government expense and repayment not having been made,
or is in prison or on probation. However, in the interest of
national security, certain area restrictions may be made by the
Secretary of State. 4" Further discussion of the theory behind
restrictions on international travel is outside the scope of this
article and will not be pursued further.
IV. CoNcLusIoN
In Shapiro the Supreme Court has expanded the compara-
tively new constitutional doctrine that some state and District of
Columbia statutes will be deemed to deny equal protection of the
laws unless justified by a "compelling" governmental interest.
47
By applying the concept to the freedom to travel interstate, this
case would seem to have the effect of enlarging the list of tradi-
tional freedoms such as speech, press, assembly, and worship
48
which normally cannot be regulated unless "to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect. '40 However, this expansion was deemed necessary by the
Court in order to preserve one of America's basic freedoms.
An analysis of Shapiro gives the reader the impression of the
opening of Pandora's box to similar litigation. For there are a
multitude of situations in which states have imposed residence
requirements. It is conceivable that litigation may be initiated
to invalidate state residence requirements on the eligibility to
vote, to engage in a certain profession or occupation, or to attend
a state-supported university.5 0 However, a prediction of the long-
term effects of the case would only be unwarranted speculation.
N. HEYwAm CLAimsow, III
45. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1 (1965).
46. FREEDoa To TRAVEL, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ComrTEE To STUDY
PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE AssoCIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
Yonxc, (1958); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
47. Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
49. Id. at 639.
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